tum-ctf-teaser-2015cryptosudhackarhash-length-extension-attackhashpump
Baby's 1st
ctf.link/assets/downloads/cry/bad_apple.tar.xz
try:
ncat 1.ctf.link 1027 < good.bin
expect:
"hello"
We are given a tar archive It has a python file which is probably the source of the service
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys, binascii
from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
key = open('key.bin', 'rb').read()
message = sys.stdin.buffer.read(0x100)
if len(message) < SHA256.digest_size:
print('len')
exit(0)
tag, message = message[:SHA256.digest_size], message[SHA256.digest_size:]
if SHA256.new(key + message).digest() != tag:
print('bad')
exit(0)
if b'hello pls' in message:
print('hello')
if b'flag pls' in message:
print(open('flag.txt', 'r').read())Also
$ xxd good.bin
0000000: 2628 455f 6617 ecea 0248 95a4 8578 ebce &(E_f....H...x..
0000010: 00fa 9204 983d 09b6 d175 7d05 dc43 0567 .....=...u}..C.g
0000020: 6865 6c6c 6f20 706c 73 hello plsWe see that the service uses sha256 to verify the signature and then process the message. We can use hash Length Extension Attack to verify a request with a message 'flag pls'.
I use hashpump to do the same. There is no information about the key. Hashpump needs a key length for the attack. We'll bruteforce that.
import hashpumpy
original='hello pls'
add='flag pls'
hash_old='2628455f6617ecea024895a48578ebce00fa9204983d09b6d1757d05dc430567'
limit=100
for i in xrange(limit):
f=open('lol/'+str(i),'w')
l=hashpumpy.hashpump(hash_old,original,add,i)
f.write(l[0].decode('hex')+l[1])
f.close()will five me hundred files in lol directory.
$ for i in {1..100}; do ncat 1.ctf.link 1027 < $i ; done
bad
bad
.
.
hello
hxp{M3rkL3_D4mg4rd_h4s_s0m3_Pr0bl3mZ}
bad
^Cfor keylength 32 it worked.
Flag
hxp{M3rkL3_D4mg4rd_h4s_s0m3_Pr0bl3mZ}